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Abstract 
The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 uncovered the weakness of the risk management in the 
banking sector. Failure of the banking risk management was due to the unforeseen risks not 
accounted for in banks’ risk management systems, along with weak supervisory monitoring. As a 
result, Basel Accords had undergone a series of improvement to stress the importance of looking 
at different risks in an integrated approach, which marked the beginning of a new era for risk 
management. Banks started to move towards implementing a holistic approach in managing risk, 
a dynamic approach, which is Enterprise Risk Management (ERM). ERM is managing risks of an 
entity under a holistic approach instead of the current silo approach. Assessing risk under the 
umbrella of ERM ensures that banks are measuring risks using all possible approaches to optimize 
their economic capital and hold the correct required regulatory capital1. Moreover, it captures the 
interdependence between risks, which enhances risk measures. The financial crisis highlighted the 
importance of market risk and how it interacts with other risks facing financial institutions. Market 
risk is the losses incurred in on and off-balance sheet items affected by changes in market prices, 
such as, interest rates and foreign exchange. This paper objective is to measure market risk as a 
standalone risk using different approaches of both traditional Value at Risk (VaR) and Expected 
Shortfall (ES) for banks in Europe, Asia and Africa regions to calculate the banks required 
regulatory capital according to Basel using Value at Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall (ES). 
Finally, the results would aid each region’s banks in determining its exposure to market risk. These 
results should be used as one of the components of the ERM approach to calculate the aggregate 
risk exposure after integration with other risks. 
  
 
1 Regulatory Capital is the level of capital set as provision for each level of a certain type of risk taken by the bank 
as a hedge. Regulatory capital is set by the responsible Central Bank for each region depending on the market 
(Elizalde & Repullo, 2007) 
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Introduction 
After the 2007-2008 financial crisis along with the current financial globalization and the rapid 
development of Fintech, financial institutions can no longer use silo approach in assessing the risks 
they are facing. Globalization is paving the way for the whole world to be connected through trade 
and exchange of services. Consequently, risk is being shared and exchanged throughout and cannot 
be looked at through a silo approach. Spillovers shocks are taking place in different regions, which 
had been the case in 2007-2008 financial crisis. These spillovers affect the global financial market, 
which in return reshape the risk management concept across banks. The source of the crisis was 
the mortgage market breakdown that had affected investors, both private and governmental, 
throughout the countries and resulted in significant losses. Prior to the crisis, banks had typically 
studied their market risk through a historical Value-at-Risk (VaR) and stress testing models. Post 
crisis, banks realized that the latter risk management systems had blind spots, which affected their 
predictions and led to the collapse of the market. Hence, Basel Accords intervened and imposed a 
new risk measurement system, which is the Expected Shortfall (ES). 
In 1985, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) was 
founded to support the National Commission of Financial Reporting (NCFR). COSO define ERM 
as “a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and other personnel, applied 
in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect 
the entity, and manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding 
the achievement of entity objectives”. ERM enhances the banks’ performance and prevent loss of 
resources, as a result, it achieves the targeted profitability levels desired by a bank. Also, ERM 
ensures that the management implements effective risk and financial reporting along with 
compliance with new regulations and laws. This results in improved reputational level and 
continuous upgrade of the risk management system in place to be aligned with the international 
best practices (COSO, 2004).  
Since market risk is an inherent factor in the risks facing commercial banks, such as credit, interest 
rate, operational and liquidity risks. This paper will assess market risk regulatory capital according 
to Basel regulations. The paper structure is divided into four parts. First, literature review 
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discussing market risk and ERM. Second, data and empirical work discussing the data used to 
construct VaR and ES to measure market risk. The third and fourth sections will be results and 
conclusion, respectively.   
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Literature Review 
ERM approach enable banks to manage risk under a holistic approach instead of the traditional 
silo one. This holistic approach entails analyzing different risks facing a bank in parallel to capture 
the interdependence between risks to estimate the aggregate risk profile of each bank (Soliman & 
Adam, 2017). Different studies on ERM confirm the necessity and importance for all financial and 
non-financial sectors to apply it. ERM has been found to have a positive effect on reducing 
earnings volatility determined by banks’ different assets, which is crucial to determine the return 
for a bank (Gatzert & Martin, 2015). Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) measured firm value using Tobin 
Q measure2 before and after ERM implementation and identified a causal effect between ERM 
and increase in firm value. According to COSO (2004), ERM encompasses the following, enhance 
risk response decisions, align risk appetite and strategy, identify and manage multiple and cross-
enterprise risks, improve deployment of capital, reduce operational surprises and losses, and seize 
new opportunities available in the market that suits the bank risk profile. Therefore, ERM leads to 
a more efficient capital allocation, achievement of optimal capital structure decisions, and better 
risk management decisions (Grace, Leverty, Phillips, & Shimpi , 2015). Therefore, ERM 
implementation leads to an increase in economic value added (EVA) and market value added (Shad 
& Lai, 2015). To sum, ERM approach is beneficial for banks as it can decrease direct and indirect 
costs under all circumstances, especially in times of distress and proposes an integrated picture to 
select investment opportunities taking all risks under consideration (Florio & Leoni , 2017).   
ERM in financial institutions, including commercial banks and insurance companies, focus on the 
integration of different risks. Typically, these risks are credit risk, liquidity risk, market risk, interest 
rate risk, operational risk, reputational risk, compliance risk and strategic risk (Adu-Gyamfi, 2016). 
A series of working papers had shed light on the importance of market risk and how it is 
intrinsically related to credit risk, liquidity risk and other risks faced by banks as mentioned in 
Bank of International Settlement (BIS) report (BIS, 2009). Basel (2019), define market risk as “
as the risk of losses in on and off-balance-sheet positions arising from movements in market prices. 
The risks subject to this requirement are, the risks pertaining to interest rate related instruments 
and equities in the trading book and foreign exchange risk and commodities risk throughout the 
 
2 Tobin Q measure is the total market value of the firm divided by its total assets. This ratio is developed by James 
Tobin who is a Nobel Laureate in economics. 
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bank. Market risk is the risk arising from movements in market prices affecting on and off-balance 
sheet positions (EBA).  
Measuring market risk is crucial as it is affects banks’ balance sheet heavily through its assets. 
When crises occur, asset values would affect heavily the bank’s shareholders and creditors 
preferences forcing the bank to sell them (Acharya, Engle, & Pierret, 2014).  For example, interest 
rate risk is an essential component of the credit and liquidity risk. Interest rates affect both sides 
of the balance sheet in terms of deposits and loans and can create interest rate gaps affecting banks’ 
current and future cash flow values. (Milanova, 2010). In addition, changes in the values of banks’ 
assets like loans and securities caused by market changes in interest rates affect the probability of 
default generating credit risk and affecting the value of the bank (Hartmann, 2010). Drehman, 
Sorenson and Stringa (2010), developed a stress testing model that showed that the re-pricing 
characteristics of trading book positions and interaction of market and credit risks are crucial for 
the valuation of banks’ total risk. Therefore, in assessing market risk it proves that there are 
diversification benefits to the banks’ trading book, which accordingly reduces the total risk. this 
shows that implementing ERM is an efficient approach to capture diversification benefits arising 
from interdependence between different risks.  
As a result, Basel Accords require banks to hold enough capital measured by capital adequacy 
ratios taking into consideration the weight of risk embedded in each asset. ERM proposes strategies 
to ensure complying to these regulatory requirements by managing the risk position and integrating 
them under all the conditions to improve profitability by reorganizing the held assets through risk 
and return using risk adjusted return on capital as mandated by Basel (McKinsey & Company, 
2013). Regulatory capital is identified through risk-return relationships through risk measures.  
Value-at-Risk (VaR) is the most famous tool to measure market risk. It is well recognized by 
Basel and they recommend its use in banks to capture regulatory capital (Basel Committee, 
2004). VaR is the potential loss on a market position or portfolio under specific tenor (O'Brien & 
Szersze´n, 2017). VaR had been the most widely used model for banks since 1993, yet a recent 
change was proposed by Basel III to using Expected Shortfall (ES). VaR analysis implies that 
risk is randomly distributed not correlated (Whitehead, 2011; Chen, 2014). In laymans terms, 
VaR relies on historical data using normal distribution to predict expected loss. For example, an 
investor investing $1Mn on an index fund tracking S&P 500, their expected loss will report a 
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VaR of $23.3k. The latter means that using normally distributed returns with this investor at a 
standard deviation of 1%, can lose $23.3k or more on this investment (Chen, 2014).  
Post the financial crisis, the disadvantages of VaR had been shed light on heavily and was decided 
by the Basel Accord to switch to Expected Shortfall (ES). ES is an expanded version of the VaR, 
a transformative of the VaR (Zeigal, 2013). ES can be described as conditional VaR or the expected 
beyond the limit calculated by VaR which means that it accounts for all the losses beyond the VaR 
calculations (Chen, 2014). ES measures the riskiness of a position by considering both the size and 
the likelihood of losses above a certain confidence level. The Committee has agreed to use a 97.5% 
ES for the internal models-based approach and has also used that approach to calibrate capital 
requirements under the revised market risk standardized approach (Chen, 2014). 
The shift to ES by Basel had been sought because VaR was found out to present inaccurate results 
in distressed periods, which was proved after the financial crisis. VaR can overstate the entire 
portfolio in relation to its components and understate the bank-wide level risk when measuring 
portfolio of risks or assets affected by market risk by a bank (Chen, 2014). In addition, VaR’s 
credibility had been questioned as it does not have a sub-additive3 feature and consequently is not 
coherent. In 2016, Basel Committee decided to replace VaR by ES driven by VaR’s different 
shortcomings. First, VaR had incentivized banks to take on tail risk which is the risk of extreme 
market losses since it has a low probability under normal market conditions. In crises, VaR does 
not capture risk of market illiquidity as witnessed in 2008 when banks were unable to exit or hedge 
positions in a short time frame resulting in substantial losses. Moreover, VaR metrics do not factor 
in credit risk accurately in the event of credit rating downgrade of issuers of tradeable investments 
which can lead to undercapitalized exposures in the banking books (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2019). In summary, Basel Committee accords that shift to ES will ensure better 
capturing of “tail risk”, which will improve capital adequacy during periods of financial market 
stress (Basel, 2016). Building upon the point that VaR is sub-additive, this means that adopting an 
ERM initiative will not affect the market risk and its calculations positively leading it to having a 
higher VaR unlike ES. ES is coherent and not sub-additive which means that it would be affected 
positively as banks adopt ERM more. 
 
3 VaR of a portfolio can be higher than the sum of VaRs of individual assets in the portfolio. (Danielsson, Jorgenson, 
Sarma, G. de Vries, & Samorodnitsky, 2005) 
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Empirical Work 
Following the methodology of Ralf Kellner and Daniel Rosch (2016), this paper will calculate 
VaR and ES VaR to measure market risk regulatory capital under each model. This methodology 
was used as it suits the available nature of the data and answer the main research hypothesis, which 
assumes that measuring market risk of ES is more accurate than traditional VaR during time of 
financial market crisis.   According to both Basel and the international best practices, ES capture 
tail losses that suits the nature of the market risk and better than that of traditional VaR. To clarify; 
Ho: Expected Shortfall (ES) is equal to VaR or less under an (α=0.975) 
H1: Expected Shortfall is higher than VaR under an (α=0.99) 
 Kellner and Rosch (2013) compared shortfall model (α=0.975) and VaR (α=0.99) with respect 
to model risk. Kellner and Rosch estimated both models for financial data through using a 
conditional GARCH model comparing eight innovations’ distribution. Their data set consisted of 
daily negative log returns for three indices (S&P 500, Dax and Nikkei 225) and their respective 
two exchange rates (USD/EUR and EUR/YEN). Data had been collected from January 2001 till 
January 2015 and they estimated a rolling window of 1000 days to derive daily risk measure 
forecasts for day 1001. Their models were based on different distributions. Kellner and Rosch 
had found that the models which capture heavy tails and/or skewness are the ones that can 
accurately forecast VaR and ES. In addition to measuring VaR and ES, the authors tested 
different parameters in order to evaluate the best methods to estimate the risk parameters through 
estimating parameters for ARMA (1,1) and GARCH (1,1). Ralf and Kellner’s results supports 
this paper’s hypothesis which is that risk estimates for Expected Shortfall (α=0.975) is higher 
than that of VaR (α=0.99) which encourages higher levels of regulatory capital. In addition, they 
found out that during financial crises, difference between VaR and ES tends to increase proving 
that ES is more conservative. Ralf and Kellner as well pointed out that these differences can 
trigger regulatory arbitrage especially in times of financial turmoil. 
Moreover, ES encourages holding higher capital than VaR driven by the distributional 
characteristics of the model. 
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Data  
Thomas Reuters database was used to obtain data on banks from three different regions which 
are Europe, Asia and Africa. Each list would contain ten medium sized banks and ten large sized 
banks to have a homogenous sample. Size of medium and large banks would be defined by total 
asset value that will be obtained from Thomson Reuters Eikon and Data Stream. Period of the 
data will be spread over 20 years daily to ensure the validity of data. However, since the 
European Union had been formed in 2001, data had been collected from January 2002 till June 
2019.  
The data analyzed come from the daily values of 42 banks, of which 20 Asian, 16 European and 
six African banks. Daily values were retrieved from Thomson Reuters for the time period from 
January 1st, 2002 to June 26th, 2019. The analysis of each bank separately was preferred in order 
to minimize the inaccuracy caused by data not being available and manipulating the results. Each 
region had been divided through asset size into small and large banks as per the tables below. This 
thesis data consists of daily log returns for 42 banks from three regions with their respective 
historic volatility, market cap, monthly beta, total assets, daily bid and ask, risk weighted assets 
and total liabilities.  
All the latter had been used to calculate the VaR and ES models using EVIEWS of model α=0.99 
and α=0.975 respectively for three regions separately which are discussed as per the below. VaR 
and ES were calculated through building an ARMA (1,1) and GARCH (1,1) as per the reference 
paper following the below details.  (Kellner & Rosch, Quantifying market risk with Value-at-Risk 
or Expected Shortfall? - Consequences for capital requirements and model risk, 2016). 
In details, VaR measures the risk for a given time t and the return of a given asset is Xt. VaR
α
t (Xt) 
is the value at risk for Xt at a certain confidence level 0≤ α ≤1. The α-quantile is the distribution 
of Xt and it is given by  
𝑃𝑟[𝑋𝑡 ≤ 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝛼 (𝑋𝑡)] = 𝐹 (𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝛼 (𝑋𝑡)) = 𝛼       (1) 
It follows that  
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝛼 (𝑋𝑡) =  𝐹𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑣(𝛼)          (2) 
where Finv is the α-quantile of the distribution of Xt.  
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To allow time varying conditional means and variances of returns, ARMA-GARCH model is 
applied. The model for the conditional mean is an ARMA (1,1) is given by, 
𝑋𝑡 = 𝜇 + ∅𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝜑𝜃𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑡, 
where θt is the error term and μ,∅ and φ are constant parameters.  
The model for the conditional variance Ϭ2t is GARCH (1,1) given by  
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝜔 + 𝛼1𝜃𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽1𝜎𝑡−1
2          (3) 
The parameters 𝛼1 and 𝛽1capture respectively the effect of news and the volatility persistence.  
If we assume that follows the normal distribution, the VaR will be given by  
 
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡+1
𝛼  (𝑋𝑡+1) = 𝜇𝑡+1 + 𝜎𝑡+1𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼(𝑍𝑡)       (4) 
where  𝜇𝑡+1 =  𝜇 + +∅𝑋𝑡 + 𝜑𝜃𝑡  , 𝜎𝑡+1 =  √𝜔 + 𝛼1𝜃𝑡
2 + 𝛽1𝜃𝑡
2  , and Zt = 
𝑋𝑡− 𝜇𝑡
𝜎𝑡
. 
Accordingly, ES is given by: 
𝐸𝑆𝑡+1
𝛼  (𝑋𝑡+1) = 𝜇𝑡+1 + 𝜎𝑡+1𝐸𝑆𝛼(𝑍𝑡)       (5) 
where  
𝐸𝑆𝛼 (𝑍𝑡) =
∫ 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡+1
𝛽1
𝛼
(𝑍𝑡+1)𝑑𝛽
1−𝛼
         (6)  
Africa  
Banks are sorted ascendingly by asset size. Banks that have smaller asset base which starting from 
Commercial International Bank “CIB” have larger VaR and ES. ES shows higher losses than VaR 
which confirms the literature that ES is more conservative and would require to hold higher 
regulatory capital except for one banks, Nedbank Group and Banque De l’Habitat. First, Nedbank 
group is currently suffering losses and higher beta than the other banks. For Banque De L’Habitat, 
its VaR and ES are underestimated since calculations did not account for any risk weighted assets. 
On the contrary, Banque De L’Habitat’s VaR and ES should be higher since it had been reporting 
losses for the last two years. 
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Bank Country Value at Risk Expected Shortfall 
Standard Bank Group South Africa -2.1567682% -2.7145945% 
NedBank Group South Africa -2.9819956% -3.7440525% 
AttijariWafa Bank Morroco -2.1567682% -2.7145945% 
Commercial International 
Bank “CIB” 
Egypt -3.0087240% -3.7954901% 
Banque De L'Habitat Tunisia -2.2635019% -2.8444502% 
Export Development Bank Egypt -3.7037762% -4.6464305% 
 
Asia 
Similarly, Asian banks had been sorted ascendingly by asset size showing higher ES than VaR as 
per the literature. Ping An Bank is the median of the banks showing that the above banks, large 
banks, have higher VaR and ES than the smaller ones with few exceptions. Below Asian banks 
show an average VaR of approximately -3.8% and ES of -4.8%. Banks that exceed the average are 
Sumitomo, Commonwealth, CIMB and Mizuho which had suffered losses over the past few years 
explaining higher VaR and ES than the average.  
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Bank Country VaR ES 
Bank Central Asia Indonesia -3.2311% -4.0763% 
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Japan -3.6635% -4.5911% 
Mizuho Financial Group Japan -4.2450% -5.3203% 
Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group, Japan -12.9167% -16.1681% 
ICICI Bank India -3.9883% -5.0199% 
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank China -3.5877% -4.5080% 
China Minsheng Bank  China -3.4898% -4.3848% 
HOKKOKU Bank Japan -2.9467% -3.6930% 
Bank of Iwate Japan -3.0320% -3.8006% 
Ping An Bank Co., Ltd China -3.8555% -4.8426% 
Yamagata Bank Japan -2.7639% -3.4629% 
Bank of Okinawa Japan -2.8420% -3.5674% 
Hang Seng Bank Japan -2.0907% -2.6264% 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia Australia -5.1900% -6.5033% 
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Australia -2.4398% -3.0624% 
Westpac Bank Australia -2.3610% -2.9640% 
DBS Bank Singapore -2.4181% -3.0367% 
Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp Ltd 
“OCBC” 
Singapore 
-3.9338% -4.9470% 
United Overseas Bank. Singapore -2.3490% -2.9499% 
CIMB Bank Thailand -4.2186% -5.2799% 
 
Europe  
Below are a sample of European banks assorted ascendingly as per the asset size with the majority of their 
VaR and ES lying around -4.18% and -5.18% respectively. Likewise, ES is more conservative than VaR 
which requires the banks to hold higher regulatory capital. VaR and ES reflect the banks’ operations and 
their held assets as shown in Greek Attica Bank which has been doing worse than its European counterparts 
as a consequence of Greece’s debt crisis.  
Bank v Country VaR ES 
BNP Paribas S.A France -3.8801% -4.8649% 
Credit Agricole S.A France -4.0959% -5.1340% 
Banco Santander S.A Spain -3.5014% -4.3893% 
Deutsche Bank S.A Germany -4.0461% -5.0615% 
Societe Generale De France France -4.3344% -5.4303% 
UniCredit Bank  Italy -4.4953% -4.4953% 
Intesa San Paolo S.p.A Italy -4.1341% -5.1825% 
Commerzbank AG Germany -4.7049% -5.8844% 
KBC Group  Belgium -4.8447% -6.0778% 
Banco Desio S.p.A Italy -3.0204% -3.7865% 
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CRCAM France -2.1959% -2.7560% 
KAS Bank N.V Netherlands -3.3234% -4.1655% 
Agram Bank Croatia -4.2309% -5.3085% 
Attica Bank Greece -8.6083% -10.7497% 
Banca Finnat Italy -3.3754% -4.2338% 
Merkur Bank Germany -4.2309% -5.3085% 
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Conclusion 
By measuring Value at Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall (ES) for 42 banks spread over three 
different continents, Europe, Asia and Africa, this paper proves the literature that ES requires 
banks to hold more regulatory capital than VaR. ES showed more losses than VaR throughout all 
the continents reflecting each bank’s operations, profitability…etc. as shown in the results. As 
mentioned in the literature, holding higher regulatory capital adds to the banks’ costs yet it saves 
banks more in times of crises such as in 2008. However, choosing ES as a method of determining 
regulatory capital is more beneficial than VaR since ES is not sub-additive, which means that it 
accounts for integration is managing the risks of the bank. In conclusion, implementing ERM in 
banks can save them different costs when using ES more than VaR. Future research might build 
on this study by calculating ES under ERM and test the diversification benefits. First, ES should 
be calculated after integrating market risk with liquidity risk. Secondly, ES should be calculated 
after integrating market and liquidity risks with credit risk and so on and so forth. Afterwards, 
these ES results with its implications on regulatory capital levels should be reported to top 
management levels of banks.   
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